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I.

COMBATTING CORRUPTION

Meng-Lin Liu recognized the damage that corruption causes,
and he risked his livelihood to do what he could to stop it. 1 Liu, a
Taiwan resident, was a compliance officer for Siemens China
Limited (“SCL”), a Chinese subsidiary of Siemens A.G., a German
corporation with securities registered in the United States. 2 While
working as a compliance officer, Liu discovered that SCL was
making inflated bids to sell medical equipment to hospitals in
North Korea and China. 3 Third party intermediaries would sell
the equipment and would forward portions of the purchase price to
the officials that accepted the bids. 4
In October 2009, Liu expressed concerns that the company
was violating compliance measures put in place after Siemens

*I graduated from The John Marshall Law School in Spring 2016. This
comment is dedicated to my late friend Jean Maurice Nahkla.
1. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between
Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 125, 182-83 (2009); Liu
Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2014).
2. Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
3. Id.
4. Id.
829
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plead guilty to a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violation
in 2008. 5 According to Liu, in December 2009, the company
retaliated against him for raising concerns by giving him a
negative performance evaluation. 6 However, this did not stop Liu’s
efforts to correct the company’s wrongdoing. 7 During 2010, Liu
attempted to change company procedures and cut ties with the
intermediaries involved in the kick back scheme. 8 His superiors
thwarted both of these attempts, and, in August 2010, he was
stripped of nearly all his authority. 9
Liu’s efforts to end this corruption persisted and he compiled
documentation proving the scheme. 10 Late that year, Liu
presented the documents first to the company’s CFO and then
during a meeting attended by the President and CEO of SCL. 11
The same day as that meeting, Liu received a letter ordering him
to not report to work for the remaining three months of his
contract. 12 Early the following year, Liu reported the possible
FCPA violations to the United States Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).13
Corruption, such as that experienced by Liu, imposes
significant economic, political, and social costs on society. 14
Businesses use bribes to obtain a business advantage, reduce
costs, enhance efficiencies, or gain access to relationships or
markets. 15 However, bribes have negative ramifications such as
interfering with free market systems and blocking market entry. 16
Corrupt conduct can harm an entire economy by potentially
increasing
costs,
lowering
growth rates, and reducing
productivity. 17
Bribery
encourages self-gain over societal
wellbeing, increases income inequality, and obstructs access to
5. Id.
6. Liu, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 327
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery
Laws, 49 AM . BUS. L.J. 325, 328 (2012) (discussing research that shows
corruption brings “impediment to economic growth, degradation of social and
political institutions, misallocation of resources and skills, impoverishment,
and numerous other societal ills”).
15. Id.
16. Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 G EO. J. INT’L L. 861, 869-75
(2010) (arguing that bribes ruin free market economies); see also Philip M.
Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable
International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth
Century? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery , 20
MICH. J. INT’L L. 451, 459 (1999) (arguing that bribery distorts prices, reduces
outside investment).
17. Id.
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education, government, and other important societal resources. 18
Bribery also undermines governmental systems by encouraging
government leaders to make decisions based on personal financial
gain instead of their constituents’ best interests. 19
For decades, many countries have not actively fought
corruption. However, in 1997 many nations increased their efforts
in curbing corruption in international business. 20 For example, in
1997,
the
Organization
for
Economic
Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) adopted the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (“The Convention”).21 The Convention requires its
forty-one signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign officials,
establish a framework for criminal sanctions, strengthen
accounting laws, and cooperate with signatories which are
investigating or seeking extradition of those charged with bribery
offenses. 22
In 2003, the United Nations adopted the Convention Against
Corruption (“UNCAC”), which is similar to both the FCPA and
OECD Convention. 23 The UNCAC, however, is especially directed
towards transnational bribery. 24 Nations within the European
Union, United Kingdom, Africa, and Asia formed several regional
anti-bribery agreements. 25 While these conventions provide a
comprehensive framework and guidelines for battling corruption,
their actual effect has been less significant because compliance
and enforcement varies widely. 26
The United States has lead in the fight against corruption
since 1977. In that year, Congress passed the first major anti-

18. Gathii, supra note 1 (explaining that corruption depletes resources for
healthcare services, food, housing, and water).
19. Spahn, supra note 16, at 875 (arguing that bribery creates a
government that is “up for sale” and drives away honest political actors).
20. See generally Kathleen M. Hamann et. al, Developments in U.S. and
International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 40 INT’L LAW. 417, 423-27 (2006)
(discussing recent anti-corruption enforcement actions taking place
internationally).
21. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014,
O RGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO- OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (May 21,
2014), www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Convention Against Corruption, U.S. G OVERNMENT PUBLISHING
O FFICE (Oct. 31, 2003), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-105tdoc43/contentdetail.html.
24. David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement
of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 479
(2009).
25. Sarah Bartle et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM . CRIM . L. REV .
1265, 1294 (2014).
26. Id.
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corruption legislation in the world, the FCPA.27 In recent years,
FCPA enforcement has intensified dramatically, and the United
States is increasingly exercising the international reach of the
Act. 28
One major hindrance on FCPA enforcement is the secrecy
inherent to corruption that makes it difficult to detect.29 As a
result, regulating agencies must heavily rely on people privy to the
information, known as whistleblowers, for tips regarding
potentially illegal conduct. 30 Whether the whistleblower reports
information directly to the regulating agencies, or to internal
compliance programs that investigate and correct the conduct, he
or she is important in the fight against corruption. 31 As the SEC
and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) continue to do their part in
combatting corruption and consistently expand international
enforcement of the FCPA, they are encouraging and incentivizing
whistleblowers and the development of internal compliance
programs alike. 32
People like Liu who make the brave decision to become a
whistleblower suffer a variety of consequences in both their
personal and professional lives. 33 In the United States, the Dodd-

27. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b); id. § d(1); id. §§ (g)-(h); id. § 78 dd-1-3; id. §
78 ff (West 1997 & Supp. 2008).
28. In 2005 there were only twelve combined prosecutions, while in 2010
there were 48 DOJ and 26 SEC prosecutions. Gibson Dunn, 2014 Mid-Year
FCPA Update, Gibson Dunn (July 7, 2014), www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/2014-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.aspx. In 2013 there were 19
DOJ and 8 SEC. Id. Through the end of June 2014, there had been 13 DOJ
actions and 2 SEC actions. Id. While there has been a decline in the amount of
prosecutions since 2010, there has also been a sharp increase in non prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements. Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS . L. 1, 4 (2012);
see also Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST.
INT’L. L. REV . 961, 963 (2014) (analyzing the increase in pre-judgment
settlements).
29. Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally
Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 689, 694 (2000), www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/54388/john-brademas-and-fritz-heimann/tackling-internationalcorruption-no-longer-taboo).
30. See Indira Carr & David Lewis, Combating Corruption Through
Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection, 39 INDUS . L.J. 52, 53 (2010)
(stating that because it is difficult to detect corruption and wrongdoing
externally, whistleblowers can be very effective in uncovering corruption).
31. Kristian Soltes, Facilitating Appropriate Whistleblowing: Examining
Various Approaches to What Constitutes "Fact" to Trigger Protection Under
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 27 AM . U.
INTL. L. REV . 925, 927 (2012).
32. Nicole H. Sprinzen, Asadi v. GE Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A Case Study of
the Limits of Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections and the Impact on
Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM . CRIM . L. REV . 151, 152 (2014).
33. Andrew Smith, There Were Hundreds Of Us Crying Out For Help: The
Afterlife Of The Whistleblower, THE G UARDIAN (Nov. 22 2014),
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) provides FCPA whistleblowers with rewards as well as
protection from the negative consequences a whistleblower may
experience. 34 However, recent transgressions in the United States
court system leave potential whistleblowers uncertain of whether
they have any protection at all. 35 To continue its role as the leader
in combating corruption, the United States must amend DoddFrank to better protect potential whistleblowers.
Part II of this comment will discuss the extraterritorial reach
of the FCPA, and the role that whistleblowers and internal
compliance programs serve in its enforcement. Part III will
analyze the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank, their
significance for those who report potential FCPA violations, and
how recent U.S. court rulings may prevent many of those people
from receiving any of the benefits the provisions offer. Finally,
Part IV will propose that Dodd-Frank be amended to assure
potential whistleblowers that they will not be left out to dry after
reporting corrupt conduct.

II. E XTRATERRITORIAL A PPLICATION OF THE FCPA
In order for the FCPA to be effective, it must apply
extraterritorially, and people with inside knowledge of corrupt
conduct must be willing to come forward with the information.
This section will discuss: (A.) The concept of extraterritoriality;
(B.) an overview of the FCPA; (C.) extraterritorial application of
the FCPA; and (D.) the United States’ reliance on whistleblowers
and internal compliance programs for FCPA enforcement.

A. Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws
Some Congressional statutes seek extraterritorial jurisdiction
by regulating people or conduct outside of the United States. 36 Due
to the longstanding concept that nations exercise exclusive
jurisdiction within their own territory, extraterritorial laws have
traditionally been approached with caution. 37 As former United
States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story put it, “[E]very nation

www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/22/there -were-hundreds-of-us-cryingout-for-help-afterlife-of-whistleblower.
34. See Robert Anello, Be Careful Where You Whistleblow: Courts Impose
Limits on Dodd-Franks Protection for FCPA Whistleblowers, FORBES (Aug. 20,
2014), www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/08/20/be-careful-where-you-whistlewhile-you-work-courts-impose-limits-on-dodd-franks-protection-for-fcpawhistleblowers/.
35. Id.
36. Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV . 1673, 1677 (2012).
37. Id.
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possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
territory,” and “it would be wholly incompatible with equality and
exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation
should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within
its own territory.”38 It therefore follows that Acts of Congress have
long carried a presumption against extraterritoriality. 39
However, over time, nations have become more accepting of
extraterritorial regulations.40 In the United States, the decision as
to whether a statute can apply extraterritorially involves a twostep analysis. 41 First, analyzing the power Congress exercised by
enacting the statute. 42 Second, determining whether there was
Congressional intent for the statute to apply outside of the United
States.43
The first step requires an examination of Congress’s power to
enact the statute. 44 While Congress can pass laws with
extraterritorial reach, both the United States Constitution and
international law limit Congress’s power to regulate conduct
outside of the United States. 45 Given the historical background
and significance of these types of laws, courts often approach such
constitutional questions with great prudence. 46
If a statute is ruled constitutional, the court then must
determine whether Congress intended for it to apply
extraterritorially. 47 Such Congressional intent can be shown in two
ways. First, if a statute is intended to regulate conduct abroad,
Congress can make it clear by including extraterritorial
provisions. 48 For example, the general terrorism law includes a
provision that applies the law to conducts that “occur primarily
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or

38. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS , (Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1834).
39. Id.
40. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts
of Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV . L. REV . 377, 379 (1966) (explaining
arguments against territorial approaches to conflicts of law).
41. Parrish, supra note 36, at 1685.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. There is no territorial limit on acts of Congress. United States v. FelixGutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding, “Generally, there is no
constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of United States penal
laws”). However, there are several limitations to application of extraterritorial
laws. See Parrish, supra note 36, at 1685 (explaining how the U.S.
Constitution, the Fifth Amendment, and international law limits
extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws).
46. Parrish, supra note 36, at 1685.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which
they are accomplished. 49
While a statute without an extraterritorial provision is
presumed to only apply domestically, Congressional intent to
regulate foreign conduct may be imputed if the law focuses on
international activity. 50 There is no established test for such
analysis, but the FCPA is an example of a statute that carries
extraterritorial power even though it lacks an explicit
extraterritorial provision. 51

B. Overview of the FCPA
In 1976, an SEC investigation revealed that hundreds of U.S.
companies were bribing foreign officials. 52 The following year,
Congress responded by enacting the FCPA as an amendment to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Securities Exchange Act”).53
Both the DOJ and SEC enforce the FCPA. 54 Enforcement of
the FCPA is carried out through two sets of provisions. 55 The first
set is the accounting provisions. These provisions require issuers
(“issuers” are generally companies that are required to register
their securities with the SEC, or those that are required to file
reports with the SEC) to implement certain record keeping and
internal controls standards.56 The provisions also require issuers
to implement bookkeeping practices to ensure that any records
accurately reflect their transactions in reasonable detail.57 The
provisions further require that issuers create internal accounting
controls that ensure that transactions are executed with
appropriate authorization. 58
49. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331.
50. See Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White
Collar Crime, 34 AM . CRIM . L. REV . 325, 3329 (1997) (noting that perhaps one
of the most noteworthy instances of Congress’s intent to control conduct
outside the United States is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
51. Id.
52. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corru pt
Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INTL. L. & COM . REG. 83, 87 (2007).
53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977).
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b); id. § 78m(2); id. § 78m(b)(2).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 780(d); Id. § 781(g); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b); id. at § 78m(2).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(7) (defining “reasonable detail” as a “level of
detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct
of their own affairs”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-831, at 10 (1977) (noting that,
“[T]he issuers records should reflect transactions in conformity with accepted
methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off -the-books
slush funds and payment of bribes”).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2); see also Bartle et al., supra note 25, at 1271-72
(noting that when evaluating internal controls systems, the SEC considers
several factors: “(i) the role of the board of directors; (ii) communication of
corporate procedures and policies; (iii) assignment of authority and
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The second set is the anti-bribery provisions that prohibit
bribery of foreign officials for purposes of securing a business
benefit. 59 The anti-bribery provisions outlaw improper payments
to any person for purposes of obtaining or securing a business
benefit abroad. 60 An anti-bribery provision violation occurs when
seven elements are met: (1) any issuer, domestic concern
(“domestic concerns” are generally any person that is a U.S.
citizen, resident, or national, or any business located or organized
in the U.S), or any person inside the United States (“any person”
has been interpreted broadly, and extends to any officer, director,
employee, or agent or any stockholder of the issuer or domestic
concern); (2) that makes use of mails or any other means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce; (3) to corruptly; (4) offer to
pay, promise to pay, authorize the payment of any money, or, offer
a gift, promise to give, or authorize the giving of anything of value;
(5) to any foreign official, political party or candidate for political
office or any other person while knowing that some payment will
be passed on to such parties; (6) to influence any act or decision,
inducing unlawful action or inducing action to influence any act of
a government or instrumentality to secure any improper
advantage, (7) to obtain, retain or direct business to any person. 61

responsibility; (iv) competence and integrity of personnel; (v) accountability for
performance and compliance with policies and procedures; and (vi) objectivity
and effectiveness of the internal audit function”).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(1), (g), (h), id. § 78dd-1; 78dd-2; id. § 78dd-3; id. § 78ff.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
61. Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17
CURRENTS : INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 4 (2008); 15 U.S.C. §§ 780(d), 781(g); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), id. § 78dd-3(a). In
the Senate Report attached to the FCPA it is noted that “[t]he word ‘corruptly’
connotes an evil motive or purpose, an inte nt to wrongfully influence the
recipient.” S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977); see also United States v. Kay, 513
F.3d 461, 465 (5th Cir. 2008) (providing a jury instruction for this element).
The Act does not define “anything of value”, and courts have inte rpreted the
term broadly. See Bartle et al., supra note 25, at 1277 (2014) (explaining that
“anything of value” has included “money, gifts, discounts, charitable
donations, use of resources [e.g., materials, facilities, and equipment],
entertainment, luxuries [e.g., food, travel, meals, lodging], and promises of
future employment”); see also Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 G EO. J. INT’L L. 907, 914-15 (2010) (stating “recent FCPA
enforcement actions allege facts concerning ‘things of value’ across a wide
spectrum”); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2 (for domestic
concerns); id. § 78dd-3 (for “any person”). The term “foreign official” has been
interpreted broadly. See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV . 99, 101-04 (2011)
(detailing the large scope of people that “foreign official” may cover); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)&(B); id. § (2)(A)&(B); id. § (3)(A)&(B) and 78dd2(a)(1)(A)&(B); id. § (2)(A)&(B); id. § 3(A)&(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers);
id. § 2 (for domestic concerns); id. § 3 (for “any person”). Some of these
elements are the topic of hot debate. See generally Rouzhna Nayeri, No Longer
the Sleeping Dog, the FCPA Is Awake and Ready to Bite: A nalysis of the
Increased FCPA Enforcements, the Implications, and Recommendations for
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Any issuer, domestic concern, or person that is found to violate the
FCPA may face civil penalties, criminal penalties, or government
procurement
sanctions. 62
However,
depending
on
the
circumstances, companies may be offered the opportunity to enter
deferred-prosecution or non- prosecution agreements. 63
Due to the burdens of complying with the FCPA, critics
accuse the Act of making American companies less competitive in
international business. 64 In order to address these criticisms,
Congress amended the FCPA twice, adding two affirmative
defenses and expanding its international reach. 65 The first
affirmative defense allows for payments that are “lawful under the
written laws” of the country in which they are made. 66 The second
affirmative defense permits payments that are “reasonable and
bona fide expenditures.”67 Congress also passed legislation that
allows a corporation to make “grease” payments to expedite the
performance of routine government actions. 68 The Amendments
also included provisions intended to expand the international
reach of the FCPA, partly as an effort to level the playing field for
American companies. 69

Reform, 27 N.Y. INTL. L. REV . 73, 82 (2014) (arguing that several terms within
the FCPA are too ambiguous and interpreted too broadly); see also Cyavash
Nasir Ahmadi, Regulating the Regulators: A Solution to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Woes, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 351 (2012) (proposing several changes
to the FCPA).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); id. § 2 (for domestic concerns); id. § 3
(for “any person”).
63. See D. Michael Crites, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at Thirty Five: A Practitioner's Guide, 73 O HIO ST. L.J. 1049, 1059 (2012) (providing
examples of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements).
64. See Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV . 861,
867-70 (2001) (discussing ways the FCPA can inhibit American businesses).
65. See Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and
Extortion in International Business Transactions, 49 HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 303,
318-19 (2012) (examining changes that have been made to the FCPA); 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2 (for domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-3
(for “any person”).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2 (for domestic concerns); id.
§ 78dd-3 (for “any person”).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2 (for domestic concerns); id.
§ 78dd-3 (for “any person”).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers); 78dd-2 (for domestic concerns); § 78dd3 (for “any person”). See also Ivan Perkins, Illuminating Corruption Pathways:
Modifying the FCPA's “Grease Payment” Exception to Galvanize Anti Corruption Movements in Developing Nations, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
325, 338-44 (2013) (discussing the history and reasoning behind the creation of
the exception, and identifying issues that it creates).
69. See Ivan Perkins, Illuminating Corruption Pathways: Modifying the
FCPA's “Grease Payment” Exception to Galvanize Anti-Corruption Movements
in Developing Nations, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 338-44 (2013)
(discussing the history and reasoning behind the creation of the exception, and
identifying issues that it creates).
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C. The Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA
In recent years, the DOJ and SEC have dramatically
increased
FCPA
enforcement,
especially
internationally. 70
Between 2005 and 2010, more than half of the companies that
were involved in FCPA resolutions were either foreign companies
or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies. 71 In 2010, foreign
companies “were responsible for 94 percent of the penalties
imposed on corporations.”72 A list of recent and current FCPA
cases proves that the trend continues, as it shows a large number
of enforcement actions against foreign companies, domestic
companies functioning abroad, and foreign nationals. 73
The FCPA applies extraterritorially through multiple
provisions.74 First, any issuer, domestic concern, or person can be
held liable for “any act outside the United States in furtherance of
a violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the Act …irrespective
of whether such United States person makes use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.”75
70. Id; Koehler, supra note 28, at 4.
71. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 24th National
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010),
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech101116.h tml.
72. Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in
FCPA Enforcement, FCPA Digest 1, 5 (Jan. 20, 2011), http://fcpa.shearman
.com/files/5e1/5e13bd87afdb6375d24106e9be4c1954.pdf?i=4cc77c6ff7e8b5511e
d46036cb879f70 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
73. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. HewlettPackard Polska, SP. Z O.O., No. CR-14-202 EJD (N.D. Cal. 2014) (charging a
Polish employee, five Russian employees, and a group of individuals in Mexico,
employed by H.P. subsidiaries in each country, in connection with “creating a
slush fund for bribe payments”, to facilitate bribes to “foreign officials”); see
also United States v. ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O., No. CR-14-201 DLJ (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (reaching a plea agreement for Russian subsidiary),
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-zao/hp-russia-pleaagreement.pdf; see United States v. Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de
C.V. (2014) (entering non-prosecution agreement for Mexican subsidiary),
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-mexico/hp-mexiconpa.pdf; see also Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hoskins,
No. 3:12-cr-00238-JBA (D. Conn. 2013) (charging French company Alstoms
senior vice president for Asia region in connection with improper payments in
power plant project in Indonesia), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases
/pomponi/de50-second-superseding-indictment.pdf; see Criminal Complaint,
United States v. Cilins, No. 13-MAG-975 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (charging Frederic
Cilins, a French citizen, “with attempting to obstruct an ongoing investigation
into whether a mining company paid bribes to obtain mining rights in the
Republic
of
Guinea”),
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2013/04/15/Crim inal-Complain t.pdf.
74. See Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 157 (explaining the international reach
of the FCPA).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g)1; id. § 2(i)(1); id. § 78dd-2(h)(5); id. § 78dd3(f)(5); id. § 78c(a)(17); see H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the
Government's Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INTL. L. & COM . REG.
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The FCPA defines “interstate commerce” as “trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or
between any foreign country and any State or between any State
and any place or ship outside thereof.”76 Under this definition, any
issuer, domestic concern, or person that sends a fax, email,
telephone call, or text message either to or from the United States
is subject to FCPA enforcement regardless of location.77 Likewise,
any issuer, domestic concern, or person is subject to FCPA
enforcement by using any United States banking system, or
traveling to, from, or within the United States. 78 Thus, a U.S.
national or company is prohibited from violating the FCPA
regardless of whether they are within the United States and even
if that conduct does not have any other nexus to the United
States. 79
Second, an issuer is not required to have any physical
presence or regular conduct in the United States. 80 Issuers are
companies that have securities registered in the United States, are
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act, or own more than fifty percent of the voting stock of
another entity in the United States. 81 Accordingly, any company
that qualifies as an issuer can be held liable for FCPA violations
regardless of whether the conduct occurred or was directed
towards the United States.
Finally, a foreign national or foreign company can become
subject to FCPA enforcement by committing an act in furtherance
of a corrupt payment while inside the United States, or by
conspiring with or acting as an agent for a domestic concern or
issuer while committing such conduct. 82

239, 291 (2001) (explaining that the 1998 amendments “greatly extended the
jurisdictional reach of the FCPA by making violations of the Act by foreign
individuals and entities, in addition to actions by U.S. nationals overseas,
prosecutable in the United States”).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(5); id. § 78dd-3(f)(5); id. § 78c(a)(17).
77. Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice and
Enforcement Division of the United States Securities Exchange Commission,
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , United States
Department
of
Justice,
(Nov. 14 2012), www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Brown, supra note 75, at 317 (noting that “[I]n short, jurisdiction
based on nationality is asserted over all U.S. persons regardless of the sites of
the acts in furtherance of the violation and regardless of whether there is a
nexus to interstate commerce within the United States”).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 780(d); id. § 781(g).
82. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998); see also Brown, supra note 75, at 358
(explaining that the U.S. has jurisdiction of over foreign nationals who commit
an act in furtherance of violations of the FCPA).
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D. FCPA Effectiveness Largely Relies on Internal
Compliance and Whistleblowers
In recent years, the SEC and DOJ have increasingly
encouraged companies to develop internal compliance programs to
detect and correct corrupt or illegal conduct. 83 Internal controls are
not a new concept; the FCPA actually requires that companies
take some compliance measures. 84 Since 2010, though, both the
SEC and the DOJ have increasingly incentivized developing and
expanding of internal compliance programs.85 During that year,
the SEC rolled out a new program to encourage cooperation with
FCPA investigations and enforcement actions. 86 The program
introduced deferred prosecution agreements (“DPA’s”) and “nonprosecution agreements (“NPA’s”). 87 Though the legitimacy of
these agreements is debated, the SEC and DOJ use them to
reward companies that have compliance programs in place. 88
For example, in 2013, the SEC used its first NPA to resolve
an FCPA violation by Ralph Lauren Corporation (“RLC”). 89 In
reaching the agreement, the SEC acknowledged that its decision
not to prosecute RLC was impacted by the company’s internal
compliance initiatives and willingness to self-report. 90 Even when
DPA’s and NPA’s are not offered, the SEC and DOJ have been
more lenient to companies if they self-report or have effective
internal compliance measures. 91 There is reason to believe internal
compliance will be encouraged even more, as James
Sensenbrenner, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, has suggested
amending the FCPA to provide an affirmative defense to
companies that have compliance programs. 92
83. Bartle et al., supra note 25, at 1311.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b); id. § 78m(2).
85. Koehler, supra note 28, at 990.
86. SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Companies to
Cooperate and Assist in Investigations, (Jan. 13, 2010), United States
Securities Exchange Commission, www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm
87. Id.
88. See Koehler, supra note 28, at 7 (arguing that DPA’s and NPA’s are
problematic because they lack transparency and do not follow the principles of
the rule of law). Koehler argues the use of these agreements are “a blow to the
rule of law which values enforcement of the law in an open, transparent
matter and in the context of an adversarial proceeding,” and went on to state
that because the “use resolution vehicles that are not subjected to one ounce of
judicial scrutiny, this is not something to praise, it is something to lament.” Id.
89. Koehler, supra note 28, at 989.
90. Id.
91. Richard L. Cassin, Top Ten Disgorgements, FCPA Blog (Mar. 14, 2011,
8:02 AM), www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/14/top-ten-disgorgements.html#--Top
Ten Disgorgements; Koehler, supra note 28, at 990.
92. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 112th
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Along with internal compliance programs, the United States
also relies on whistleblowers to report potential FCPA violations. 93
The SEC assures potential whistleblowers that the Commission is
willing and able to provide benefits and protection. 94 In September
2014, the SEC handed out a thirty million dollar reward, the
largest ever, to a non-United States citizen who reported FCPA
violations that occurred abroad. 95 Sean McKessy, Chief of the
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, asserted that the award “shows
the international breadth of our whistleblower program as we
effectively utilize valuable tips from anyone, anywhere to bring
wrongdoers to justice.”96 He even went so far as to claim that
“[w]histleblowers from all over the world should feel similarly
incentivized to come forward with credible information about
potential violations of the U.S. securities laws.” 97
Despite these assurances, many whistleblowers actually may
not receive any protection from the United States at all. 98 Some
courts have held that if an employee follows the encouraged
method of reporting FCPA violations internally instead of directly
to the SEC, they may not be considered a whistleblower. 99 Also, as
the law currently stands, the anti-retaliation provisions of DoddFrank do not apply extraterritorially, thus foreign whistleblowers
do not receive any protection even if they report a legitimate FCPA
violation that is prosecuted.100
Cong. 1 (2011).
93. Carr, supra note 30.
94. In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted ,
United States Securities Exchange Commission (Sept. 22, 2014),
www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72301.pdf.
95. SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award, United States
Security Exchange Commission (2014), www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease
/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290#.VEq9KCldVqs.
The
award
was
announced after the decision in Liu. Id.; Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.
3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). The SEC took the opposite position of the court in
Liu, and explained, “[i]n our view, there is a sufficient U.S. territorial nexus
whenever a claimant's information leads to the successful enforcement of a
covered action brought in the United States, concerning violations of the U.S.
securities laws, by the Commission, the U.S. regulatory agency with
enforcement authority for such violations”. Id. The SEC further stated that its
belief is this type of approach is the best way to effectuate the purpose of the
program which was to “further the effective enforcement of the U.S. securities
laws by encouraging individuals with knowledge of violations of these U.S.
laws to voluntarily provide that information to the Commission.” In the Matter
of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted , Release No. 73174
(S.E.C. Release No. Sept. 22, 2014).
96. In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted,
supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. Anello, supra note 34.
99. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Egan I].
100. Anello, supra note 34.
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These rulings strongly contradict the message that the SEC
and DOJ are sending to potential whistleblowers. 101 On one hand,
the United States government is actively encouraging internal
reporting of misconduct and assuring whistleblowers they are safe
to come forward. On the other hand, they find themselves without
any protection or reward if they report internally, or are located
outside of the United States, where most of the corrupt conduct is
likely to occur.102

III. THE I NTERSECT OF DODD-FRANK AND THE FCPA
As mentioned in section II, persons that report corrupt
conduct suffer a variety of personal and professional
consequences. 103 To help assure that coming forward with
information on corruption won’t ruin a person’s life, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions which protect
whistleblowers. 104 This section will (A.) discuss the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions; (B.) discuss a series of court rulings that
limit the effectiveness of the provisions; and (C.) examine how
these court rulings undermine the message the United States has
been sending whistleblowers, and disincentivizing coming forward
with information.

A. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
In 2010, Congress passed Dodd-Frank. 105 The Act was a direct
response to the financial crisis of 2008 and overhauled regulation
of the financial system. 106 Section 922 of Dodd-Frank is
particularly important for individuals who report potential FCPA
violations. 107 This provision added Section 21F to the Securities
Exchange Act, which protects whistleblowers. 108 The provision
101. Id.
102. Mike Koehler, The Odd Dynamic Persists, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 22.
2013, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/07/financial-reformbills-whistleblower.html.
103. See Section II.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
106. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 96 (2012) (claiming that “[T]he Dodd-Frank Act was the
government's historic response to the causes of the economic crisis”).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012); see also Mike Koehler, The Financial
Reform Bill's Whistleblower Provisions and the FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR (July
20, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/07/financialreform-bills-whistleblower.html (explaining that sections 922-924 are
especially important for FCPA enforcement because they create new
whistleblower protections that may apply to FCPA whistleblowers).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (amending The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by inserting Sec. ‘21F, titled “Securities Whistleblower Ince ntives and
Protection”).
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defines a whistleblower as “any individual who provides, or 2 or
more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating
to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”109
Section 922 protects a whistleblower by keeping identities
anonymous until an action is commenced, offering financial
rewards for reports of securities law violations, and prohibiting
retaliatory actions by employers. 110 By providing these protections,
this provision encourages the reporting of conduct that potentially
violates securities laws, including the FCPA. 111
The financial rewards provisions of Section 922 have come to
be known as the “Bounty Provisions”, and are integral to the
enforcement of the FCPA. 112 They allow for financial compensation
to be awarded to a whistleblower that provides “original
information” regarding alleged misconduct. 113 The amount that the
whistleblower receives depends on a number of factors, but if the
information leads to a recovery of more than one million dollars,
the whistleblower must receive between ten and thirty percent of
the monetary sanctions. 114
The anti-retaliation provisions set forth in Section 922
prohibit an employer from discharging, demoting, suspending,
threatening, harassing or treating an employee in any
discriminatory manner as a response to the employee providing
information to the SEC regarding illegal conduct. 115 They also
prohibit such conduct in retaliation for making disclosures that
are required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities
Exchange Act, or any other law, rule, or regulation under the
jurisdiction of the SEC. 116 If the company retaliates against the
employee, Dodd-Frank provides a private cause of action. 117 If the
109. 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a).
110. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(2)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B);
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
111. See S. REP. NO. 111-176 at 110 (2010) (noting that Congress’s intent
in enacting the whistleblower provisions in Dodd-Frank was to motivate
whistleblowers to come forward so the Government can identify those who
violate securities laws).
112. Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153 (explaining “[c]ommentators and
employment and securities law practitioners commonly refer to the program
as a ‘bounty program’”).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3) (stating that original information must be
“derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower.”).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A). The Act provides several criteria that the
SEC must consider in determining the amount of the award, including the
significance of the information provided, the degree of assistance provided by
the whistleblower, and the Commission’s interest served by awarding
whistleblowers. Id. The SEC may not take into account 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(c)(1)(B). Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
117. To demonstrate a cause of action, the employee must show:
(1) he or she was retaliated against for reporting a violation of the
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employee wins the lawsuit, he is entitled to reinstatement with the
same seniority status as before, plus twice the amount of back pay,
with interest, and compensation for litigation costs. 118
Although the benefits of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provisions would seem to provide adequate security for those
reporting FCPA violations, courts are split as to how a person
qualifies as a whistleblower. 119 Also, courts have uniformly found
that they did not apply extraterritorially and, thus, offer no
protection to FCPA whistleblowers abroad. 120

B. Scaring Away Whistleblowers
A series of court rulings may scare away potential
whistleblowers for two reasons. First, the cases created great
uncertainty as to how a person qualifies as a whistleblower.121
Second, the cases established that whistleblowers located outside
of the United States will not be protected from retaliation by his
employer. 122 The first relevant case was Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Limited. 123 The FCPA was not at issue in
Morrison, but the case still impacted the availability of protection
for FCPA whistleblowers. 124 In Morrison, a group of investors in
the National Australia Bank alleged that the bank engaged in
deceptive conduct when purchasing a Florida mortgage servicing
company. 125 The investors filed suit in the United States District
Court in New York, alleging that this conduct violated the
Securities Exchange Act. 126
The District Court dismissed the case and the Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed that decision. 127 The Supreme Court’s majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, relied heavily on the

securities laws[;] (2) [the employee] reported that information to the SEC or to
another entity;
(3) the disclosure was made pursuant to a law, rule, or regulation subject
to the SEC's jurisdiction;
(4) the disclosure was “required or protected” by that law, rule, or
regulation within the SEC's jurisdiction.
Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (holding that plaintiff
was not entitled to Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection because the
disclosed conduct did not violate securities laws).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
119. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F. 3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013);
Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 995; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *3.
120. Anello, supra note 34.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 247 (2010).
124. Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153.
125. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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presumption against extraterritoriality. 128 Justice Scalia noted
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.” 129 The majority concluded
that the Securities Exchange Act did not clearly indicate that
Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially. 130 Thus,
the Court presumed that Congress only intended the Act to apply
to securities listed on a domestic exchange. 131 Ultimately, even
though the Court found that the Bank’s conduct was illegal, the
Securities Exchange Act did not reach its conduct because the
bank was not listed on an American stock exchange. 132 As
discussed in Section II, the presumption against extraterritoriality
was not a new concept, but Morrison effectively reaffirmed it. 133
Two years later, the District Court for the Southern District
of Texas applied the principles of Morrison in Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), LLC.134 In Asadi, the plaintiff, Khaled Asadi, a citizen of
both Iraq and the United States, was a United States employee of
G.E. who was “temporarily relocated” to work at a GE office in
Amman, Jordan. 135 While in Amman, Asadi became concerned
about potentially crooked hiring practices at GE and corrupt
agreements between GE and the Iraqi government. 136 After
expressing concerns about the possibility of FCPA violations to his
supervisor, he received poor performance reviews and was
eventually fired. 137 In 2011, Asadi filed suit in the United States
alleging violation of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions and
state-law breach of contract claims. 138
At first glance, it was not actually clear whether Asadi even
qualified as a whistleblower. The language in Dodd-Frank
requires that a whistleblower report the information to the SEC,
and Asadi never actually reported the conduct to the SEC. 139
However, two other District Courts had already held that the
language of Dodd-Frank was too narrow and that, despite the
statutory language, a person could qualify as a whistleblower

128. Id.
129. Id. at 248.
130. Id. at 265.
131. Id at 256.
132. Id.
133. Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153.
134. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 2012 WL 2522599 (S.D. Tex. June
28, 2012).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A).
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without reporting directly to the SEC. 140 Ultimately, the Asadi
court did not reach this issue.
Instead, the Court dismissed Asadi’s Dodd-Frank claim
because the language of the anti-retaliation provision does not
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application. 141
The Court held that the anti-retaliation provision only applies
where a disclosure is required or protected under SOX,142 the
Securities Exchange Act, 143 or any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 144 Asadi argued that
his disclosures were protected under Section 806 of SOX and
required under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX. 145 But the Court
rejected this argument, holding that Section 806 also does not
overcome the presumption against extraterritorially. 146
Asadi further argued that his disclosures were protected by
another law subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission: the
FCPA. 147 However, the Court dismissed this argument because
Asadi did not prove that the FCPA protects or requires disclosure
of violations. 148 Asadi appealed the District Court decision. 149
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, but reached its
decision through different reasoning.150 The Fifth Circuit
addressed the issue that the lower court bypassed, and held that
Asadi did not qualify as a whistleblower because he did not report
any information to the SEC. 151 Thus, the Fifth Circuit entirely

140. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 995; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *3. The
conflict is that Dodd-Frank's statutory definition of whistleblower requires the
disclosure be made to the SEC. Id. However, the anti-retaliation provision
protects an employee for reporting the misconduct without specifying that the
disclosure be made to the SEC. Id. In Egan, the court acknowledged that a
literal reading of the definition requiring reporting to the SEC would
“effectively invalidate” the anti-retaliation provisions protection of disclosures
that are not reported to the SEC. Id. The Court decided that the best solution
was to treat the provision’s protected reports that are not made to the SEC as
a “narrow exception” to the statutory definition of a whistleblower. Id. The
court in Nollner followed the reasoning set out in Egan. Nollner 852 F. Supp.
2d at 995.
141. Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599 at *5.
142. 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.
143. 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
144. Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599 at *6.
145. Section 806 of SOX provides whistleblower protection for employee of
publicly traded companies in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
146. Id. In Camero v Boston Scientific Corp., the First Circuit held that
there was no indication in the language, legislative history, or application of
the statute itself that allowed for Section 806 of SOX to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d
4, 18 (1st Cir. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
147. Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599, at *6.
148. Id.
149. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F. 3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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avoided the extraterritorial reach of the anti-retaliation
provision. 152
The Second Circuit, though, recently saw this exact issue in
Liu v. Siemens. 153 After Liu was discharged from his job, he filed
suit in the United States District for the Southern District of New
York. 154 Liu alleged that Siemens violated Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision by firing him for reporting potential FCPA
violations. 155 The District Court, following the reasoning of
Morrison and the district court in Asadi, held that Liu’s claims
must be dismissed because the anti-retaliation provision did not
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 156 The Court
rejected Liu’s arguments that his disclosures were protected under
Section 806 of SOX, ruling that it also does not overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 157 The Court further held
that disclosure of FCPA violations are not required or protected by
Section 806 regardless of its extraterritorial jurisdiction. 158 The
court also discussed the issue of whether a person must report
information to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower but refrained
from taking a stance on the issue159.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit upheld
the District Court’s opinion. 160 The only issue the Second Circuit
addressed was whether the anti-retaliation provision applies
extraterritorially. 161 Due to similarities in the facts of each case,
the Court used Morrison as precedent in holding that merely
listing some securities in the United States does not avail a
company to extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States laws. 162
The Court then looked at the language of the anti-retaliation
provision, and found that it “contains no hint that the antiretaliation provision is meant to apply extraterritorially.” 163

152. Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153.
153. Liu, 763 F.3d at 177.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. By the time the District Court ruled on Liu, several other courts
had followed the Egan stance on the issue. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 42 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ.
5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v.
Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106–07 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Trans–Lux
Corp., No. 11 Civ. 1424(SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *3–5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25,
2012). However, at least one other court adopted the Asadi Fifth Circuit ruling
declining to read in the exception. Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12–cv–
00381–RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *4–6 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013); Banko v.
Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977, 2013 WL 6623913, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013).
160. Liu, 763 F.3d at 177.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Therefore, Liu was not provided any protection. 164 This decision
was the first, and only, time that a United States Circuit Court
ruled on the matter. 165

C. How These Cases Undermine Internal Compliance
and Provide Disincentives for Whistleblowers
Morrison, Liu, and Asadi have major implications for
potential FCPA whistleblowers. 166 Each case effectively limits, or
entirely eliminates, protection for FCPA whistleblowers.167
Moreover, the results of these cases seem to be at odds with both
the SEC’s strong encouragement of internal compliance and the
increasing extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA. 168 While
reporting corruption is encouraged, potential whistleblowers are
(1) left wondering whether they will receive protection if they
report the misconduct to internal compliance programs; and (2)
not provided any protection if they are not within the United
States.
1.

Internal Compliance May Leave Whistleblowers without
Protection

After these cases, it remains unclear who qualifies as a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank. 169 The plain language of DoddFrank requires a person to report misconduct to the SEC in order
to trigger protection. 170 However, the anti-retaliation provision
only requires that the disclosure is required or protected by
statute in order to receive anti-retaliation protection. 171 A number
of district courts have held that this is a contradiction and ruled
that disclosure to the SEC is not required. 172 Likewise in 2011, the
SEC published a rule granting protection to whistleblowers
regardless of whether the disclosure was made internally or to the
SEC. 173 The SEC also filed an amicus brief in Liu, urging the

164. Id.
165. Anello, supra note 34.
166. Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153.
167. Id.
168. Mike Koehler, The Odd Dynamic Persists, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 22.
2013, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/07/financial-reformbills-whistleblower.html.
169. Anello, supra note 34.
170. Asadi, 720 F. 3d at 621.
171. Id.
172. SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34300, 34304 (June 13, 2011).
173. The SEC promulgated a rule to side step the issue of whether a
whistleblower must report to the SEC. Id. When the rule was announced, the
SEC stated “[t]his change to the rule reflects the fact that the statutory antiretaliation protections apply to three different categories of whistleblowers,
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Second Circuit to show deference to its rule and allow protection
for disclosures made internally. 174 Despite the desires of the SEC,
the Second Circuit did not rule on the issue as the claim was
dismissed for other reasons. 175
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Asadi ruled that to qualify as
a whistleblower, the disclosure must be made to the SEC. 176
Although the ruling in Asadi is of higher authority, several district
courts have taken the opposite position. 177 The likely result of this
conflict is that a potential whistleblower is either not going to
come forward with the information for fear of not being protected,
or is going to go straight to the SEC with the information. 178 Both
situations undermine the general purpose of the provisions. 179
Withholding information about corruption allows corruption to
persist. 180 Moreover, requiring reports to be made to the SEC
contradicts the encouraged practice diminishes the benefits of
internal compliance. 181

and the third category includes individuals who report to persons or
governmental authorities other than the [SEC].” Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–
2(b)(1).
174. The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief before the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Liu. Brief for the SEC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Liu
Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F. 3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). In the brief, the
SEC urged the court to adopt its rule on that a whistleblower need not disclose
the information to the SEC because ruling otherwise would “jeopardize the
benefits of internal reporting.” Id.
175. Liu, 763 F. at 182.
176. Asadi, 720 F. 3d at 621.
177. Liu, 763 F.3d at 177
178. Infra note 180 (stating that a primary objective of the whistleblower
protections is to avoid burdens that prevent whistleblowers from first
reporting internally).
179. See S. REP. NO. 111-176 at 110 (2010) (stating that the SEC would
gain more from a whistleblower program that encourages people with
knowledge of violations to come forward).
180. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery:
Expanding the scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employer, 46
HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 425, 427-28 (2009) (arguing that whistleblower protection
needs to be expanded and claiming between that forty to sixty of the 240 to
300 billion dollars lost in corruption annually is through bribery and petty
corruption).
181. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Program's Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting , 86
TEMP. L. REV . 721, 752 (2014) (noting that internal whistleblowing allows
wrongful conduct to be detected earlier, reduces costs, and improves
relationship with government; see also Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program's Antiretaliation Protections for Internal
Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV . 721, 728 (2014) (noting that “[e]ffective internal
compliance programs and the existence of compliance officers within
companies provide enormous benefits”). Parcella further argues that internal
compliance programs offer assurance that companies are adhering to the
numerous laws and regulations imposed upon them, an internalization of
compliance policies by employees to ethically affect business decision making,
the need for fewer regulatory burdens as legislators and regulators could be
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Employees Working Overseas Are Not Protected From
Retaliation

The only point of clarity these cases provide is that the antiretaliation provision will not apply extraterritorially as it is
currently written. 182 Considering the emphasis that Morrison
placed on the presumption against extraterritoriality, this was the
easiest decision that the courts could make. 183 Given that there is
no indication of Congressional intent for the provision to extend
internationally, there is likely no argument that could have
persuaded the courts otherwise. 184
This result is troublesome because, as mentioned above, the
SEC and DOJ have made great efforts to expand international
enforcement of the FCPA while also simultaneously incentivizing
internal compliance. 185 In doing so, the United States government
is encouraging employees stationed abroad to first report possible
FCPA violations internally. 186 Meanwhile the Chief of the SEC’s
Office of the Whistleblower is essentially advertising its
whistleblower protections as all-inclusive, But these cases show
that that is simply not true. 187 Instead, any employee stationed
abroad that reports possible FCPA violations taking place outside
the United States will be open to retaliation from their employer
for reporting the misconduct. 188 This unfortunate reality
undermines the efforts of the United States government and the
purpose of the FCPA. 189 Lack of protection from retaliation will
certainly prevent whistleblowers from coming forward, thus
leaving corruption unpunished. 190 While some may argue that the
potential for a bounty award is enough incentive to come forward,
it is important to remember that bounty rewards are far from
guaranteed. 191 Additionally, strong preference for a bounty may
undermine the concept of internal compliance. 192 These negative
convinced that companies are not motivated solely by self-interest, and the
identification of problems before they become larger and more problematic
issues. Id.
182. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247.
183. Liu, 763 F.3d at 182.
184. Id.
185. Bartle et al., supra note 25, at 1311.
186. Id.
187. SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award, United States
Securities Exchange Commission, (Sep. 22 2014), www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290#.VEq9KCldVqs;
Anello,
supra note 34.
188. Id.
189. See Hamann et al., supra 20, at 422 (discussing recent anti-corruption
enforcement actions taking place internationally).
190. Id.
191. Koehler, supra note 28, at 8.
192. Id.
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implications inhibit the effectiveness of the FCPA.193 If the United
States government is going to continue its extraterritorial
enforcement of the FCPA, it must amend Dodd-Frank so that
potential whistleblowers abroad can feel safe about reporting
corruption either internally or to the United States.

IV. C ONGRESS SHOULD AMEND DODD-FRANK TO BETTER
PROTECT FCPA WHISTLEBLOWERS
The negative impacts of corruption are undeniable, and
societies at large stand to benefit from the fight against it.194 While
other countries are increasingly joining the effort to fight
international corruption, the United States has led the cause.195
Many other nations have developed anti-corruption policies, but
most are not strictly enforced, which leaves the United States as
the leading force in combatting corruption.196
However, Asadi and Liu have exposed the shortcomings of
whistleblower protection in the United States, and these
shortcomings are serious threats to the efforts made against
corruption.197 The United States needs to continue to lead the fight
and, at the very least, protect its own citizens from retaliation for
reporting corruption. Even though certain aspects of the FCPA
may be controversial and opinions on its effectiveness vary widely,
the FCPA is here to stay. 198
There are many different elements of FCPA enforcement that
some believe need fine-tuning or general reconstruction.199
193. Pacella, supra, note 181.
194. Nichols, supra note 14.
195. Weiss, supra, note 24.
196. For the past ten years, Transparency International assesses the
enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Shruti J. Shah, OECD
Enforcement Grades Are In (And Still Aren’t Pretty), THE FCPA BLOG (Oct. 23,
2014), www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/10/23/oecd-enforcement-grades-are-in-andstill-arent-pretty.html. Each country receives a grade of either active,
moderate, limited, and little or no enforcement. Id. This year, the grade was
based upon each countries enforcement actions from 2010-2013. Id. Only four
of the 41 signatories received a grade of “active” (United States, Germany,
U.K., and Switzerland). Id. Five countries received a “moderate” grade (Italy,
Canada, Australia, Austria, and Finland). Id. Therefore, according to the
report, “there is no deterrence to foreign bribery in countries which make up
34.6% of the world’s exports.” Id.
197. Meng-Lin Liu, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 326; Asadi, 720 F. 3d at 621.
198. In 2013, Charles Duross, at the time the deputy chief of the U.S.
Department of Justice's FCPA unit, stated, “We're investing in the [FCPA]
program… everyone’s committed to doing this work." Brian Mahoney, Expect
More Big FCPA Cases in 2014: DOJ, SEC Officials, LAW 360 (Nov. 19, 2013),
www.law360.com/articles/489940/expect-more-big-fcpa-cases-in-2014-doj-secofficials. Kara N. Brockmeyer, the chief of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission's FCPA unit, also stated "One of the things that we are doing very
actively is ... we are spreading the message of the FCPA". Id.
199. In 2012, the US Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform
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However, a necessary and easy action that Congress can take is to
amend the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions in the Securities
Exchange
Act to provide protection to foreign FCPA
whistleblowers. This will better fulfill the objectives of the FCPA.
The amendment would eliminate disincentives for potential
whistleblowers by: (1) protecting potential whistleblowers outside
of the United States; (2) providing protection to potential
whistleblowers regardless of whether they report misconduct
internally or directly to the SEC; and (3) affording protection to
potential whistleblowers that were not required by law to report
the corrupt conduct.
To achieve this, the whistleblower provisions should read as
follows (changes marked in bold):
1.

A whistleblower is any individual who provides, or 2 or more
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission or to an
internal compliance department of an entity that is subject to
the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission 200

wrote a letter to the SEC and DOJ seeking guidance on “several issues and
questions of significant concern to businesses seeking in good faith to comply
with the FCPA.” US Chamber of Commerce, et. al., Guidance Concerning the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Letter to Lanny Breuer and Robert Khuzami
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://crossbordergroup.typepad.com/files/fcpa_guidance_
letter_02_21_2012.pdf. One area the letter addressed was the need for
clarification on what entities may be considered “instrumentalities” of foreign
governments. Id. The letter stated that the current ambiguity has led to a
“chilling effect on legitimate business activity...and a costly miscalculation of
compliance resources.” Id. The letter also sought guidance on what would be
considered “an effective FCPA compliance program” such that a program
would receive favorable treatment on an enforcement action. Id. The letter
then sought an outline of “reasonable standards for [pre -acquisition] diligence
and identify factors that will be considered in determining whether diligence
was adequate,” to address the issues concerning parent liability and successor
liability. Id. Further, as the DOJ has stated that it will not prosecute “de
minimis” gifts and hospitality, the letter asked for a “clear standard for gifts
and hospitality that ordinarily will not be subject to enforcement action.” Id.
Moreover, the letter asked for clarification of the Mens Rea standard that will
be applied for corporate liability. Id. The FCPA only holds individuals liable
for “willful violations”, but does not specify how corporations may be held
criminally liable. Id. The final major issue addressed was the DOJ’s practice of
“Declination Decisions.” Id. The letter asked for the DOJ to consider changing
its practice of not providing details or information as to why some
investigations are closed with without any charges being filed. Id. The letter
claimed that such information would be “tremendously useful to companies
seeking to comply with the FCPA.” Id. The SEC responded to the letter in
November 2012, providing guidance on some of the issues that were
addressed. Bartle, supra note 25, at 1313.
200. This would amend the language of Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. §78u6(a).
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No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against,
a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment
because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower-i.
ii.

iii.

in providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or
judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or
in making disclosures that if true, may lead to an
enforcement action under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act against the employer or one or more of its employees ,
or are required or protected under the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of
2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including section 10A(m) of
such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of Title 18,
United States Code, and any other law, rule or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 201

These amendments would remove major disincentives that
potential whistleblowers might face. First, with the amended
language, the whistleblowing statute would overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 202 By including a direct
reference to the FCPA, there would be a clear indication that the
provisions carry an intention to apply extraterritorially. This
intention is evident because the FCPA is designed to curtail
conduct that is likely to occur outside of the United States. 203 A
reference to the FCPA will assure United States citizens stationed
that their employer will not be allowed to retaliate against them
for reporting misconduct. The same assurance would also protect
foreign nationals that work for any company that is subject to the
FCPA.
Second, by providing that a whistleblower may be a person
that reports FCPA violations internally, the statute would clarify
that a whistleblower does not need to report the misconduct to the
SEC first. 204 This ensures that internal compliance would not be
undermined and that the potential whistleblower would not need
to make the difficult decision of whether to report the misconduct
or to internally or to the SEC. Instead, the person could decide
what they felt was the most appropriate method of reporting the
misconduct, knowing that their employer cannot retaliate against
them in any way.

201. This would amend the language of Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(B)(i).
202. Id.
203. Anello, supra note 34.
204. Liu, 763 F.3d at 182.
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Third, the amended statute eliminates the notion that to
receive protection, the disclosure must be required or protected
under a current United States statute. 205 Thus, the potential
whistleblower would not need to guess whether the disclosure will
be one that is required or protected, but rather, would only need to
know that the conduct might be a violation of the FCPA. This
would eliminate the suppression of rightful disclosures by assuring
that the person will be protected from retaliation even though the
disclosure is not required, and even if it does not actually lead to
an FCPA enforcement action.
Consider the following hypothetical, which illustrates the
troublesome
conditions
that
currently
confront potential
whistleblowers and that my proposed amendment would prevent.
A large United States manufacturer decides to expand its market
in another country. 206 To do so, the company sends one of its top
strategists to work at its subsidiary in the target country. Through
the course of their duties, that employee obtains knowledge that
the president of the foreign subsidiary has been bribing foreign
officials. In exchange for the bribes, the foreign country’s officials
agree to classify the company’s products as a different product in
order to avoid a higher tariff schedule. 207
The employee understands that it actually benefits the
company financially to refrain from corrupt conduct, and also
believes it is morally wrong to illegally bribe foreign officials. 208
The employee reports the misconduct to the compliance
department of the foreign subsidiary as potential violations of the
FCPA. The next day, the employee is told that he is under
investigation for sexual harassment and is suspended indefinitely.
Two weeks later, the employee is terminated for sexual
harassment of another employee and is sent back to the United
States. Under these reasonably conceivable circumstances, the
employee would not receive any protection in the United States
from the retaliation he suffered for reporting the corrupt
205. Id.
206. Some argue that international expansion of U.S. companies
contributes great economic growth for the United States economy. Elizabeth
Dexheimer, Companies Expanding Overseas Create U.S. Jobs, Study Says ,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1204/companies-expanding-overseas-create-u-s-jobs-study-says.html. Those that
follow this belief claim that international business activities also create a
substantial amount of jobs for American citizens. Id.
207. In some instances, government officials demand bribes from importers
under the threat of classifying products in a more heavily taxed category.
Roberta Gatti, Corruption and Trade Tariffs, or a cause for Uniform Tariffs,
The
World
Bank
Development
Research
Group,
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2216 (last visited Nov.
7, 2014). Similarly, companies sometimes offer bribes to those government
officials to persuade them to categorize the product in a category that carries a
lower tax. Id.
208. Nichols, supra note 14.
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practices. 209 He would not be protected simply because he reported
the misconduct internally first, and all of the conduct occurred
abroad.
However, the proposed amendment to Dodd-Frank would
allow the employee to come forward with the information without
having to worry about the retaliation he may suffer. This type of
protection would help avoid the increases in income inequality,
obstruction in access to education, the government, and other
important societal resources, and all of the other negative impacts
brought on by corruption. 210

V. CONCLUSION
Our country started the fight against corruption, and should
continue the effort while also adapting to the forces of
globalization. 211 To do so, the United States government should
make it clear that people who join the cause are safe from
retaliation and should not hesitate to help. 212 As the circumstances
currently stand, whistleblowing may be too risky for many
people. 213 The government is sending a conflicting message of
209. Anello, supra note 34.
210. Gathii, supra note 1.
211. Aside from the moral concerns of combatting corruption, the United
States also has significant economic interests fighting corruption. ALAN
LARSON ET. AL., CORRUPTION AND THE G LOBAL ECONOMY 237-38 (Kimberly
Ann Elliott, 1997). Alan Larson argues that U.S. actions against corruption
are motivated by the fact that among other factors, bribery distorts global
markets and hinders economic development, undermines democratic
accountability, weakens unstable governments, and creates a trade barrier for
companies that refuse to engage in corrupt practices. Id. Larson goes on to
claim that the U.S. ultimately seeks to create a level playing field for U.S.
firms, while also strengthening international competition and as a result
encouraging economic development and democratic institutions. Id. Shang-Jin
Wei suggests that as the world becomes increasingly global, anti-corruption
efforts (especially those of the IMF) are becoming increasingly important. Wei
claims that corruption may prevent a country from being able to enjoy the
benefits that globalization may offer. Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and
Globalization,
BROOKINGS
POLICY
BRIEF
SERIES
(April
2001),
www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/04/corruption-wei; see also Anup
Shah, Corruption, G LOBAL ISSUES (last updated Sept. 4, 2011),
www.globalissues.org/article/590/corruption (explaining that the globalized
international economy needs to be further scrutinized because it makes
corruption easier and further disenfranchises people suffering as a result of
corruption).
212. See Sprinzen, supra note 32, at 153 (presenting the question “[s]hould
not the law protect an employee of a U.S. company who reports potential
FCPA violations?” and arguing that they should have protection).
213. Whistleblowers can be retaliated against in many ways. See Pacella,
supra note 181 (explaining that whistleblowers can experience nonfinancial
disincentives including psychological pressure, social isolation, workplace
harassment, threats and mistreatment, exclusion from business opportunities,
termination, and other consequences).
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incentivizing
internal
compliance,
while
simultaneously
disincentivizing internal compliance by not providing protection to
potential whistleblowers. This will only slow down the fight
against corruption.214
As the courts currently interpret the statutes, the SEC and
DOJ cannot alleviate this issue in an effective manner. To fix this
problem, Congress should amend Dodd-Frank with language
similar to that proposed in Section IV above. In doing so, Congress
would be allowing the United States to continue its fight against
corruption and maintain its role as the leader in effectively
curbing corruption for the benefit of society at large.

214. Id.

